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“It is not enough that the (foreign) 
ministry keeps citizen’s money in high risk 
junk bonds, it also makes decisions based 
on insider information, and more quickly 
saves its “own” money than that of 
depositors.”2 
 
 
 
Tens of thousands of Hungarian depositors and investors have been affected by the 
loss of hundreds of millions of EUR worth of assets.  Local governments and various 
non-profits have lost hundreds of millions.  Brokers have been arrested.  At least one 
professional football club stands on the brink of bankruptcy.  It it turns out the 
Foreign Ministry kept billions of taxpayer money in high risk junk bonds.  All of this 
has happened since police raided the Budapest headquarters of the Buda-Cash Broker 
House the night of February 23
rd
 2015.
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Hungary’s government denied insider trading after opposition members questioned a 
foreign ministry decision to withdraw state funds from a brokerage that filed for 
bankruptcy a few days later. The National Bank of Hungary suspended the licence of 
brokerage Quaestor on March 10, saying it may have sold more bonds than permitted 
under its issuance programme. The Hungarian opposition parties urged the foreign 
ministry to clarify whether it had any insider information about Quaestor’s finances. 
“The foreign ministry and its institutions had no unlawful information whatsoever,” it 
said on the government’s website. Quaestor was the third Hungarian brokerage to run 
into financial trouble within weeks in 2015.
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Before we analyse the criminal law aspects of the Hungarian broker scandals in 2015, 
we have to summarise the Hungarian criminal law regulations regarding this topic, 
especially the Hungarian concept of the insider trading in the Criminal Code and in 
other legal regulations outside of the criminal law as well. 
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In a traditional market the customers bear all the relevant information, which is 
needed before making the decision of the actual purchase. They can analyze the 
product or even compare it to an other merchant’s offer. The stock exchange, as one 
of the means of the modern wholesale trade, shows similarities but even more 
dissimilarities with the regular market. As we know, it has two basic types: one of 
them is the stock exchange (or market), where securities, especially shares and bonds 
are traded, and the other is the commodity exchange, where usually raw materials 
(wheat, corn, coffee, rock oil, etc.) as well as eventually foreign currency are 
merchandised. The very first stock exchange of the world was founded in Amsterdam 
during the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, but nowdays the word ‚stock exchange‘ 
does not neccesarily mean an actual physical location, it is rather considered as a 
certain gathering of the actors of the market, who are connected to each other by 
formal trading rules and communication networks. These performers appearing in the 
stock market make investment decisions. A contrary to the regular market, where the 
customer decides on the ground of costs collated to the expected profits, during 
concluding a decision of investment the investor concentrates on two matters: the 
anticipated future yield and the risk. In order to conclude a proper decision they need 
the most information available. These investors expect that all the relevant 
information is true, holistic and available for everybody in the same time and same 
amount and all of these are guaranteed by strict rules. The ideal goal would be to 
provide the same amount of information for everybody in every moment. Because of 
these the undertakings of the stock exchange have to publicize certain datas by time to 
time and it is also declared everywhere among the principles, that insider trading and 
market influencing is forbidden. The perpetrator of insider trading basicly harms other 
performers of the market by his/her act. If he sells securities wherewith he holds 
unflattering information, then the customer comes off badly, but if he is expecting the 
rise of the rates, he pulls out the money of the pocket of those, who would have kept 
their position. Insider trading can also cause harms on a macro level, because it can 
result the pullout of foreign investors and capital from the market. 
Hungary joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 and became its member with full 
rights. In addition to the starred blue flag, we adopted the complete legal material, 
European law, as well, which poses serious challenges to the actors of jurisdiction, 
and has an effect on economic criminal law. This effect, however, for the time being 
may only be indirect, as the bodies of the European Union at present cannot yet create 
criminal law norms that could be directly applicable in the member states. Even 
earlier, we were watching with interest and sympathy the endeavours aimed at the 
creation of a unified code targeting the protection of the financial interests of the 
Community, and we think this work – in which we would also like to take part now – 
is to be continued. 
The main European background norm on insider trading is the new 2003/6/EC, which 
replaced the former 1989/592/EEC directive, but the 2003/124/EC and the 
2003/125/EC directives also contain rules related to the topic. The new directives 
significally widened the sphere of insider information compared to former directives. 
The insider information is not interpreted only in connection with securities anymore, 
but this definition also includes information related to financial means and derivative 
securities, which leads directly to a wider range of impeachment because of insider 
trading. 
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The current Hungarian regulation on insider trading can be found in the paragraph 
410 of the new Hungarian Criminal Code (the Act 100 of the year 2012.) 
 
410. § (1) Someone who 
 a) transacts operation referring to a financial mean by using insider 
information 
b) regarding to the insider information in his/her possession assigns an other 
to transact operation referring to a financial mean, 
c) due to benefit snatching gives insider information away to an unauthorised 
person 
commits a crime, and can be punished by maximum 3 years of imprisonment. 
 
 
In Hungary this crime was unknown before 1990, but we are not at all late. ‚In the 
United States there has been legal regulation related to insider trading since 1934, and 
since 1981 in the United Kingdom. In Germany (where the stock market bears old 
traditions) the regulation came into force only in 1994. The European Union declared 
its principles forbidding insider trading in 1989.‘5 
The statement of facts of insider trading got its current form in 2005. It became 
shorter thatn the former ones (for example the ‚forbidden security-trading‘ and the 
‚insider security-trading‘), but it also widened the range of objects on which this 
crime can be committed (not only on securities but also on ‚other financial means‘), 
and at last it does not contain the definition of insider information anymore, since that 
is included in one of the backgroundnorms. 
The Act on Capital Market of 2001 (Tpt.) stands in the background of this crime. This 
statute provides a vigorous competence for the State Supervision of Financial 
Organisations, where today a separated department deals with the problems of insider 
trading (Market Controlling Department). The National Bank of Hungary is 
authorised to charge the perpetrator of insider trading and market influencing with a 
penalty, if he/she violates, eludes, omits or performs late one of the provisions written 
in the Tpt. or in other law derived from it, or one of the National Bank of Hungary’s 
orders or its own by-law.
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The penalty in the case of insider trading or market influencing can be between 
100.000 and 100.000.000 Forints (400 and 400.000 Euros) or maximum the 400% of 
the traceable financial benefit. This could have a strong dissuasive force in several 
cases. The announcement making obligation is also a new element in the regulation in 
the case of suspicion of insider trading (and this must be fulfilled by the investment 
service providers), but there is no criminal sanction attached to the omission of this 
obligation, so it is not a crime, but it also can result a penalty. The service providers 
are obliged to name an assigned person, just like in the case of money-laundering, but 
here the announcement has to be sent to the National Bank of Hungary. The National 
Bank of Hungary decides whether it submits an accusation to the police or settles for 
a penalty in its own competence. 
The object of the crime is the equality of chances, which is essential for stock market 
transactions and indirectly to fair market attitude.  
The offender’s behaviour is the sealing of a transaction, the crime can be committed 
outside the stock market. The phrase “sealing a transaction” does not mean that only 
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the perpetrator himself must seal the transaction, in fact it is not the typical case; 
usually they use the assistance of some kind of a broker or commission merchant. The 
investment service provider – if he is unaware of the insider character of the 
transaction – is exempted from criminal liability on behalf of his mistake. (If only 
under ordinary care he should have recognised the insider transaction, the State 
Supervision of Financial Organs may fine him.) In the first two phrases neither the 
result (gaining benefit), nor the aim of gaining benefit are elements of the statement of 
facts, so the crime is carried out even if the perpetrator suffers losses from the 
transaction. The handing over of insider information to gain benefit practically means 
the selling of such information. 
(There are disputes in the scientific literature, whether the benefit can only be a 
financial type or for example a moral acknowledgment (e.g. promotion) or the 
possibility of a sexual relationship. We are willing to accept this concept, but adding, 
that in practice it is not the usual perpetrational behaviour.) 
The method of perpetration in the first phrase is “with the use of insider information”, 
in the second is “according to the insider information in his possession”. To interpret 
this, we need to specify the definition of insider information, which we can find in the 
Act on Capital Market. 
Insider information: 
1. such important information7 concerning a financial instrument (not 
including the goods-based derived transaction) 
 that is not yet publicised 
 that is directly or indirectly connected to the financial instrument or to the 
issuer of the financial instrument  
 that in the case of publication would be capable of significantly influence 
the price of the financial instrument
8
 
2. such important information in the case of persons, who are assigned to 
execute any assignment concerning the financial instrument -excluding the ones listed 
in a. - that is connected to the current assignment given by the client- 
3. such an important information concerning a goods-based derived 
transaction, which 
 was not yet publicised 
 is directly or indirectly connected to a goods-based derived transaction 
 according to the accepted market practice should be shared with the market 
actors 
 information is regularly shared with the market actors 
 
The perpetrator can be anyone, so anyone can commit insider trade, who possesses 
insider information. The circle of so-called insider persons, who posses insider 
information, can be found in the background norm. 
  
Insider person: 
1. leading official and member of the supervising committee of the issuer 
2. manager, leading official and member of the supervising committee of the 
legal person or economical partnership without a legal personality in that the 
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issuer owns directly or indirectly twenty-five or more percent of the shares, or 
has a right to vote 
3. leading official, member of the supervising committee and manager of a legal 
person or economic partnership without legal personality that directly or 
indirectly owns ten or more percent in the issuer or has a right to vote 
4. manager, leading official and member of the supervising committee of any 
organisation participating in the distribution or in organising the public buying 
offer according to the VII. Article; furthermore any employee of these organs 
or the issuer, who participated in the distribution or in the issue, who got 
insider information during his work within a year from the distribution 
5. a natural person who directly or indirectly owns ten or more percent of the 
issuer’s capital 
6. manager, leading official and member of the supervising committee of the 
issuer’s accounting credit institute 
7. who received insider information because of his work or duties, during his 
work or exercising his regular assignments, or in any other way  
8. who received insider information through crime 
9. a person living in a common household or closely related to a person listed in 
points a.-h. 
10. a person acting on behalf of such a company, where a an insider person listed 
in points a.-i. owns a significant share  
 
The crime can only be committed intentionally, in the first two phrase with dolus 
eventualis, in the third – according to the aim- only with douls directus.     
 
 
It makes more difficult the judicature , when some important theoretical question, 
which are important in the practice aren’t specifed perfect. Because of this that for 
example there are just few criminalprocess in insider transaction. 
The first question is the definition of the benefit. There are two absolutly opposite 
opinions in the definition of benefit. One of the opinions says that the desired benefits 
can be a service like sexual contact, morever a moral admission, like an improvment, 
not just a pecuniary thing.
9
 
The justificaiton of the minister proves this opinion. The justification says, that it is 
not important, that the transmitter or the beneficiary got the benefit, or the benefit is a 
pecuniary thing or it is a kind of personal benefit. The justificiation of the minister is a 
type of the jurisprudential interpretation, so it is not binding in Hungary. Itis a kind of 
help for the judicature, so it has a big effect for the judicature, all the same that is not 
binding. 
 It is confirmed by the justification of the minister in which the legislative intention is 
explained.
10
 Even so it is confound the law in practice, because it has an opposite 
aspect. The judicature aspect is that the benefit can be only a pecuinary thing , 
because the perpetrator intention inetnt for a big profit-taking, or to avoid a price loss. 
They support this aspect of the construction of the crime, because they say if the 
insider’s breach of duty is intent for other benefits, it is effect a kind of corruption 
crime. 
The other important question is the count of the crime, there are also opposite 
opinions in this topic. One group states that the count of the crime is defined by the 
                                                         
9
 Erdősy-Földvári-Tóth: Hungarian Criminal Law Special Part  
10
 József Földvári: Hungatian Criminal Law General Part 
6 
 
numbers of economic organiztions that is concerned by the insider information until 
they join a company as a stake or shareholder. This state means that use more insider 
information, or do more transaction it is a natural unit. To reckon with the disposable 
time for the perpatrator we can exclude cumulatively. The opposite opinion states that 
the count of the crime is determine by the number of the informations, not by the 
number of the transactions, do continually transactions with the same insider 
information it effects cumulatively. 
11
 Naturally we can not define exactly what is that 
time that is already, or yet enough for determine cumulatively, and this can be diverse 
in different crimes.
12
 The insider transaction is that kind of crime, in which the 
resulation of the big profit-taking can inspire  the perpatrator very much, to use one 
insider information in a short time to do many transactions with one determination, 
for the harm of similar investors. For the judicature it is a problem to determine 
insider information definition, all the same that the Tpt. determine it exactly. The 
problem is that the definition is contain two not real exact expression. One is the 
assumption of ’’not publicized information’’. The insider is workaround this in the 
following way: the insider bring out the important information in a website, which is 
not frequently visited by the investors, the investors usually doesn’t get the 
informations from this website. In this situation we can not impeach the insider 
because he/she published the information, this information is accesible for everybody, 
altough he/she knows that not too much investor will get that information.  
Ideally the insider’s intention can not intent to select the investors who are get the 
information
13
, but it is very hard to prove that what was the intention of the insider.  
The definition of price sensitive information is also a problem, it is not sure that in a 
moment an information what effects in the market. 
14
 The price sensitivity of the 
information depends of the activity of the company, and of the function of the 
company.
15
 
There is a bigger problem than the above, the lots of insider information, because 
from these carefulness, not well prepared, trifling, bad habitudes, the belief into the 
sufficient financial materials, or because in default of ideas in criminal law the 
information do not get into the criminal investigation authorities. 
The other relative problem is to analyze, and to prove of the intention of the accused. 
Was the kitchen cooking employee be aware that he/she get an insider information 
when he/she questioned the headmaster of the company? There are some simple case 
when it is easy to decide this, but in most of the cases it is hard task. Because of this, 
maybe it will be practical to penalize incautious form of the insider transaction., like 
the Tpt. says in the 201. § (1) section. 
 
 
The instruments of the National Bank of Hungary in now days are ables to recon 
effective, and to sanctioning the insider transaction in Hungary, in the last years it 
was sensible that the cases in insider transaction were multiply. In now days the work 
of the stock market has traditions. In the form as the insider transaction is in the 
Hungarian Criminal Code is inopportune to impeach, it is necessary to clear the 
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question of the count of the insider transaction, the benefit snatching, and to solve the 
problem of the difficulty of prove. It is meritorious to make all these if we are belive 
seriously that the insider transaction can effect big harms in the economic life in a 
state.    
 
